Restitution is still not compensation

Note on Cass. com., 18 November 2026, no. 25-15.463, FS-B

Can a buyer who has obtained the rescission of a sale use the direct action to claim the price from the seller’s liability insurer? The Commercial Chamber of the Cour de cassation answers in the negative, in a decision handed down by a section of the Chamber and earmarked for publication in the Bulletin.1

As we wrote four years ago, about a notary, “restitution is not compensation”.2

The facts

A company acquires semi-trailer tippers, some directly, others under a finance lease before buying them from the lessor. The vehicles turn out to suffer from an original defect. According to the court-appointed expert, their chassis was badly designed: during tipping, it twisted until the lifting ram gave way. Three trailers were damaged as a result.3

The purchaser sues the seller and the manufacturer for rescission of the sales under the warranty against latent defects (the actio redhibitoria, Articles 1641 and 1644 of the French Civil Code), and for compensation of its loss (the action for damages, Article 1645 of the Civil Code). Their common liability insurer joins the proceedings.

The Chambéry Court of Appeal rescinds the sales and orders the insurer, jointly and severally (in solidum) with its insureds, to refund the price, i.e. EUR 216,350 excluding VAT. It justifies this order by the fact that the insurer does not deny cover for liability in respect of latent defects.

The decision quashed

The Commercial Chamber, presided over by Vincent Vigneau, quashes this decision on the combined basis of Article 1103 of the Civil Code4 and Article L. 124-3 of the Insurance Code.5

The Court holds that “since the restitution of the sale price which the seller is ordered to make following the rescission of the contract of sale is not a compensable loss, the buyer cannot bring a direct action against the seller’s liability insurer for restitution of that price”.

In other words, a liability insurer owes only what its insured owes by way of compensation. Yet the restitution of the price is not compensation owed to the purchaser. It follows that the insurer cannot be sued by way of the direct action under Article L. 124-3.

The formula may not be new, but it is sound.

Restitution “rests on an objective principle: the restoration of a balance between estates that has been upset”.6 It does not seek to make good a loss.

As the First Civil Chamber held in 2007, “the reciprocal restitutions following the annulment of the contract drawn up do not, in themselves, constitute a compensable loss which the drafter of the deed may be required to make good”.7

The Third Civil Chamber applied the same solution to the notary and the estate agent from whom the seller sought an indemnity.8

In insurance matters, the Third Civil Chamber in 1991 upheld a court of appeal that had excluded the restitution of the price from the cover, on the ground that the policy was “a liability insurance”.9 As Hubert Groutel explained, the seller’s liability insurance policy “has no business here, since the restitution of the price is not a liability debt. There is therefore no need to stipulate an exclusion”.10 The same idea appears in the writings of Jean Bigot: the actio redhibitoria or quanti minoris “is not an action in civil liability”; its nature is different.11

The 1991 and 2020 decisions, both unreported, pointed in the same direction,12 but the former reasoned mainly on the enrichment of the insured: the insurer’s performance could not place it “in a better position than if the loss had not occurred”. The Commercial Chamber itself had ruled to the same effect in an unreported 2019 decision: the restitution of the price “is not a compensable loss, from which it follows that it is not damage within the meaning of the insurance contract”.13

These precedents did not, however, settle the question exactly. The report of the reporting judge (conseillère référendaire) notes as much: in the 2020 decision, the situation was “not exactly transposable”, since the insured, the boat builder, was not bound to refund the price of a sale to which it was not a party; as for the decisions ruling on exclusion clauses, they did not decide “as a matter of principle, whether the restitution of the price owed by the insured constitutes damage”.14 The Advocate General nonetheless concluded that it is “difficult to consider that a liability insurer could, by its very nature, be bound to refund the price”.15

In its decision of 18 November 2026, earmarked for the honours of the Bulletin, the Commercial Chamber reasons on a different plane. It applies the rule to the seller’s own insurer and places it on the ground of the direct action under Article L. 124-3 of the Insurance Code. The report proposed a three-judge panel (formation restreinte);16 the case was nevertheless heard by a section of the Chamber. The referral to a section was not prompted by the insurance question, however, but by the other ground, raised by the buyer in its cross-appeal: who bears the cost of returning the goods when the sale is rescinded for defects known to the seller? The Court of Appeal had refused to order the seller and the manufacturer to collect the semi-trailers at their own expense, on the ground that the seller’s obligation was limited to repaying the price. That ruling is quashed under Articles 1641, 1644 and 1645 of the Civil Code: “if the seller knew of the hidden defects of the thing, its return is made at the seller’s expense” (para. 14). The Court thus links the burden of these costs to Article 1645, that is, to the seller’s knowledge of the defect, rather than to the mechanics of restitution alone. As for publication, the Advocate General considered that the decision, “which resolves a singular difficulty, deserves […] publication”.17 This has now been done.

The change of perspective

Until now, case law reasoned from the standpoint of the seller ordered to return the price. Through the mechanics of restitution, our seller loses nothing: it returns the price and takes back the goods. It may even be awarded compensation for the occupation or use of the thing.18 As Olivier Deshayes writes, restitution is “an objective mechanism of retro-transfer”:19 it is a zero-sum game. Our seller therefore suffers no loss for which it could seek cover from its insurer.

Here, the perspective shifts. The Court places itself on the purchaser’s side.

This is not a mere mirror effect, consisting in looking at things from the side of the creditor or of the debtor of the obligation to make restitution.

Indeed, whereas the seller claims, wrongly, to be the victim of a loss for which it seeks cover from the insurer, the buyer is in no way the victim of a harm for which it would seek compensation. It is simply the creditor of a restitution.

This is what explains the outcome. Article L. 124-3 of the Insurance Code, on which the Court relied (whereas the appeal invoked another provision), reserves the direct action to the “injured third party”, against the insurer of “the person liable”, for the “pecuniary consequences of the harmful event giving rise to the liability of the insured”.

Yet our purchaser is not an “injured third party”. It returns the goods and has the price refunded.

The restitution debt does not arise from a harmful event but, more objectively, from the unwinding of the contract.20

Likewise, the seller is not “the person liable”. It matters little what caused the contract to be unwound: the purchaser’s own mistake, the seller’s fraud, non-payment of the price, or a latent defect.

As regards the price, the direct action therefore cannot exist: there is no harmful event, no liability, no person liable and no injured third party.

Quashing the decision was therefore inevitable.

In this respect, it is irrelevant that the insurer does not deny cover. The insurer’s cover extends to the insured’s liability debt (here, the damages payable under the action for damages). It does not extend to the restitution of the price, unless the parties have stipulated cover extending “in addition, in the event of rescission of the sale for latent defect, to the restitution of the price”.21

In the words of Éric Savaux, “to return is to return; to compensate is to compensate, and the two must not be mixed up”.22

Key takeaways

  • The restitution of the price following the rescission of a sale is not a liability debt: the seller’s liability insurer does not answer for it, even where it does not contest cover.
  • The direct action under Article L. 124-3 of the Insurance Code presupposes an injured third party and a person liable; as regards the price, the buyer is merely the creditor of a restitution.

Notes

  1. Cass. com., 18 November 2026, no. 25-15.463, to be reported in the Bulletin, courdecassation.fr. ↩
  2. L. Thibierge, « Restituer n’est pas réparer », note on Cass. civ. 3e, 12 October 2022, no. 20-22.911, Lexbase Hebdo, édition privée, no. 924, 17 November 2022. The formula had already been used: M. Mekki, « Responsabilité du notaire : restituer n’est pas réparer », Gaz. Pal. 19 January 2016, no. 3, p. 39. See earlier C. Guelfucci-Thibierge, Nullité, restitutions et responsabilité, preface J. Ghestin, LGDJ, 1992. ↩
  3. CA Chambéry, 20 February 2025, no. 23/00244, courdecassation.fr. ↩
  4. Civil Code, Art. 1103, Légifrance. ↩
  5. Insurance Code, Art. L. 124-3, Légifrance. ↩
  6. M. Mekki, op. cit. (note 2). ↩
  7. Cass. civ. 1re, 27 February 2007, no. 05-21.677, reported in the Bulletin, Légifrance. ↩
  8. Cass. civ. 3e, 3 May 2018, no. 17-11.132, reported in the Bulletin, Légifrance. ↩
  9. Cass. civ. 3e, 5 June 1991, no. 89-21.392, unreported, Légifrance. ↩
  10. H. Groutel, « Le silence est d’or. À propos de l’exclusion par l’assurance de la restitution du prix à la suite de la résolution d’une vente », Resp. civ. et assur. 1991, chron. no. 24, cited by G. Courtieu, JCl. Responsabilité civile et Assurances, fasc. 581-40, § 13. ↩
  11. J. Bigot, note RGAT 1992, p. 362, cited by G. Courtieu, op. cit., § 13. ↩
  12. Cass. civ. 3e, 5 June 1991, op. cit. (note 9); Cass. civ. 2e, 25 June 2020, no. 17-24.189, unreported, Légifrance; Resp. civ. et assur. 2020, comm. 174, note H. Groutel; Lexbase Droit privé, no. 830, 2 July 2020, obs. M. Rouanne; DMF 2021, no. 834, p. 329, obs. P.-Y. Nicolas. ↩
  13. Cass. com., 3 April 2019, no. 17-18.545, unreported, Légifrance. ↩
  14. M. Buquant, report on appeal no. 25-15.463, 4 May 2026, pp. 10-11, Judilibre. ↩
  15. G. de Monteynard, opinion on appeal no. 25-15.463, p. 1, Judilibre. ↩
  16. M. Buquant, report, op. cit. (note 14), p. 2. ↩
  17. G. de Monteynard, opinion, op. cit. (note 15), p. 2. ↩
  18. Civil Code, Art. 1352-3, para. 1 (“Restitution includes the fruits and the value of the enjoyment which the thing has procured”), Légifrance; Cass. civ. 3e, 9 April 2026, no. 24-17.405, unreported (sale annulled for the seller’s fraud), Légifrance; L. Thibierge, « Nullité, moralité, restitutions », RDC 2026, no. 3, p. 47. ↩
  19. O. Deshayes, « Réduction du prix et préjudice réparable », note on Cass. civ. 3e, 14 December 2017, no. 16-24.170, RDC 2018, no. 1, RDC114z5, I. ↩
  20. Civil Code, Art. 1229, Légifrance. ↩
  21. Cass. civ. 1re, 15 December 1999, no. 97-15.494, unreported, Légifrance. ↩
  22. É. Savaux, obs. on Cass. civ. 3e, 1 February 2006, no. 05-10.845, Defrénois 30 April 2006, p. 651, cited by O. Deshayes, op. cit. (note 19). ↩