Coach on a large car park, small office, energy label and commercial lease

Note on Cass. civ. 3e, 19 November 2026, no. 25-17.523, FS-B

Does a commercial landlord who fails to attach to the lease the energy performance certificate, the inventory of service charges and the forecast of works expose itself to the annulment of the contract on the ground of mistake?

No, holds the Third Civil Chamber in a section ruling to be reported in the Bulletin. These documents are not a condition of the lease’s validity, and their absence does not give rise to a presumption that the tenant was mistaken.

The facts

By a deed of 28 June 2021, a company granted a commercial lease over a 4,000 m² plot of land, together with an 8 m² office, intended for use as a « parking pour autocars et bureau » (coach park and office). The tenant soon complained of the conditions of access to the site1. Four months later, it sued the landlord for annulment of the lease and, in the alternative, for termination.

In support of annulment, it relied on a series of omissions. The lease contained neither the energy performance certificate (diagnostic de performance énergétique, DPE), nor the inventory of service charges, taxes and fees, nor the forecast of works, all of which the statutes require to be attached or provided when the lease is entered into2. The statement of natural and technological risks was also missing.

The Tarbes Judicial Court dismissed the claim for annulment but ordered termination, relying, according to the landlord’s submissions as reported by the Court of Appeal, on the failure to provide the statement of natural and technological risks, taken together with the difficulties of access to the site3. The Pau Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the annulment claim, in the absence of any manoeuvre or intention to conceal, and reversed the termination, the premises remaining usable in accordance with their contractual purpose4.

The tenant appealed to the Cour de cassation. Its first ground of appeal had three limbs, one per document. The first noted that the Court of Appeal had rejected annulment because no manoeuvre or intention to conceal had been shown, and criticised it for failing to examine whether the absence of the DPE had caused the tenant a mistake justifying annulment. The other two raised the same complaint regarding the inventory of service charges and the forecast of works. All three relied on Articles 1130 and 1178 of the French Civil Code, together with the relevant special provision.

The dismissal

The Cour de cassation dismissed the appeal in two steps.

First, neither the delivery of the documents required by Article L. 134-3-1 of the Construction and Housing Code and Article L. 145-40-2 of the Commercial Code at the conclusion of the commercial lease, nor their annexing to that lease, constitutes a condition of the contract’s validity (§ 7).

Second, only a mistake as to a substantial quality of the performance vitiates consent, pursuant to Articles 1130 and 1132 of the Civil Code. The failure to annex or deliver these documents « ne caractérise pas en lui-même une erreur » (does not in itself amount to a mistake). According to the Court, it is for the party seeking annulment to establish that this lack of information caused a mistake as to a substantial quality of the performance, without which it would not have contracted, or would have contracted on different terms.

Yet the tenant had not specified how the absence of these documents would have been decisive for its consent, so that the Court of Appeal was not required to carry out « inopérantes » (irrelevant) inquiries.

In broad strokes, two elements of the Court’s reasoning stand out.

No annulment for lack of information

The first step turns on the nature of the provisions. Neither Article L. 134-3-1 of the Construction and Housing Code, in its applicable version, nor Article L. 145-40-2 of the Commercial Code attaches any sanction to their breach.

The Court declines to read into them an implied ground of nullity (nullité virtuelle).

This seems sound. When the legislature wishes to give the tenant a way out, it knows how to do so. Article L. 125-5 of the Environmental Code, relating to the risk statement, thus allows the tenant to seek termination of the contract or a reduction of the price where the information has not been provided5.

There is nothing of the kind for the DPE or for the documents introduced by the Pinel Act.

The solution is also consistent with general contract law: breach of the pre-contractual duty to inform (Article 1112-1 of the Civil Code) does not, in itself, entail the nullity of the contract. It may lead to annulment only « dans les conditions prévues aux articles 1130 et suivants » (under the conditions laid down in Articles 1130 et seq.), that is, if it has vitiated consent6.

No mistake as to essential qualities

There remains the ground of consent.

For a mistake to entail the nullity of the contract, it must have been decisive for consent (Article 1130 of the Civil Code) and relate to the essential qualities of the performance (Article 1132 of the Civil Code).

As a matter of terminology, the Court refers to a mistake as to a « substantielle » quality of the performance, which echoes the vocabulary developed under former Article 1110, which referred to « la substance même de la chose » (the very substance of the thing). This, however, has no bearing on the outcome.

On the merits, what matters is that the failure to provide the DPE made no difference in this case.

The Court of Appeal had found that the tenant did not specify how the lack of information resulting from the failure to deliver or annex the energy performance certificate, the inventory of charges or the forecast of works for the following three-year period would have been decisive for its consent.

From this, the Cour de cassation inferred that the Court of Appeal was not required to carry out that inquiry, described as irrelevant, into whether the failure to provide the documents had vitiated the tenant’s consent.

The solution is nevertheless not purely procedural. The dismissal admittedly rests first on the tenant’s failure to plead the facts capable of establishing the decisive character of the omitted information. A court cannot be faulted for not conducting an inquiry that nothing in the submissions made useful. But that inquiry is irrelevant only because of the substantive rule. If the omission amounted in itself to a mistake, annulment would have followed from the mere finding of the breach. It is precisely this presumption that the Court rejects.

The complaint based on the DPE was, moreover, a bold one. The only building let was an 8 m² office, on a 4,000 m² site used for coach parking: the certificate could only concern a tiny, and purely ancillary, part of the leased property. Yet whether a mistake is decisive is assessed « eu égard aux personnes et aux circonstances dans lesquelles le consentement a été donné » (having regard to the persons and the circumstances in which consent was given)7. It is hard to imagine that a transport operator, a professional in its field who had visited the premises, entered into the lease in consideration of the energy performance of an 8 m² office8. Matters would be different for premises whose operation depends closely on their energy consumption. Even then, the tenant would have to prove that the omitted information would have led it not to contract, or to contract on different terms.

A DPE « for information purposes »

One last feature of the case deserves attention. The lease was concluded on 28 June 2021. At that date, the DPE was attached to the lease « à des fins d’information » (for information purposes), and the tenant could not rely, as against the landlord, on the information it contained9. It was hard to argue that a decisive mistake resulted from the absence of a document whose very content could not be invoked against the landlord.

Still, the DPE had to be required in the first place. Independent buildings with a floor area of less than 50 m² were then exempt from it10. If this office was such a building, the obligation whose breach the tenant complained of did not exist. The issue was not put to the Court; it only highlights all the more the weakness of the DPE-based complaint.

The law has changed since. Only the recommendations accompanying the DPE now remain without effect as against the landlord11. Enforceability against the landlord, provided for by the ELAN Act and then postponed, was fully established for leases only by the Climate and Resilience Act, which came into force on 25 August 202112. Our lease was signed three days before the date initially set for enforceability, and eight weeks before it actually took effect.

Does the solution survive the new provisions? Probably. The DPE is still not a condition of the lease’s validity, and its absence still does not give rise to a presumption of mistake. Enforceability does, however, change the significance of an inaccurate DPE. The debate will then shift from missing information to erroneous information.

Takeaways

  • Delivering or annexing to a commercial lease the DPE, the inventory of service charges and the forecast of works is not a condition of the contract’s validity.
  • Their absence does not in itself amount to a mistake: the tenant must prove that the lack of information caused a decisive mistake as to a quality of the performance.

Notes

  1. CA Pau, 6 May 2025, no. 23/02495. courdecassation.fr. ↩
  2. Construction and Housing Code (CCH), Art. L. 134-3-1, as amended by Act no. 2019-1147 of 8 November 2019; Commercial Code, Art. L. 145-40-2, paras 1 and 2. Légifrance (CCH), Légifrance (C. com.). ↩
  3. TJ Tarbes, 30 August 2023, as reported in CA Pau, 6 May 2025, supra. courdecassation.fr. ↩
  4. CA Pau, 6 May 2025, supra. courdecassation.fr. ↩
  5. Environmental Code, Art. L. 125-5, V, in the version applicable to a lease concluded in June 2021. Légifrance. ↩
  6. Civil Code, Art. 1112-1, para. 6. See also L. Thibierge, « Devoir précontractuel d’information : mais où est donc Ornicar ? », RDC 2026, no. 1, p. 46. Légifrance. ↩
  7. Civil Code, Art. 1130, para. 2. Légifrance. ↩
  8. CA Pau, 6 May 2025, supra, noting that the tenant declared in the lease that it knew the premises well « pour les avoir vus et visités » (having seen and visited them), and stressing its status as a transport professional. courdecassation.fr. ↩
  9. CCH, Art. L. 134-3-1, para. 2, in its applicable version. Légifrance. ↩
  10. CCH, Art. R. 134-1, b), in its version in force from 1 January 2016 to 30 June 2021. Légifrance. ↩
  11. CCH, Art. L. 126-29, para. 2. Légifrance. ↩
  12. Act no. 2018-1021 of 23 November 2018, Art. 179; Act no. 2021-1104 of 22 August 2021, Art. 175. See M. Laisné, « Protection de l’environnement et baux commerciaux », AJDI 2022. 807, tracing this postponement and the oversight that accompanied it. Légifrance. ↩